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Abstract
Intel SGX provisions shielded executions for security-
sensitive computation, but lacks support for trusted sys-
tem services (TSS), such as clock, network and filesys-
tem. This makes enclaves vulnerable to Iago attacks [12]
in the face of a powerful malicious system. To mit-
igate this problem, we present Aurora, a novel archi-
tecture that provides TSSes via a secure channel be-
tween enclaves and devices on top of an untrusted sys-
tem, and implement two types of TSSes, i.e. clock and
end-to-end network. We evaluate our solution by porting
SQLite and OpenSSL into Aurora, experimental results
show that SQLite benefits from a microsecond accuracy
trusted clock and OpenSSL gains end-to-end secure net-
work with about 1ms overhead.
1 Introduction
Cloud environments play an important role in pervasive
computing. Cloud security has been a serious concern.
Secure cloud computation is the problem of upload-
ing data and code on remote servers owned and main-
tained by an untrusted service provider. To overcome
this threat, Intel provisions Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) technology that establishes a secure container that
protects the integrity and confidentiality of desired com-
putation. SGX enforces strong isolation in memory for
security-sensitive compartments in an application, called
enclaves, from untrusted privileged system. Many pro-
tection architectures [5, 52, 24, 1, 46, 45] utilizing SGX
have been emerging in the context of multi-tenant cloud
environments.
An enclave has no direct access to any hardware or OS
resources, such as network, storage and clock. In order
to gain access to external resources, an enclave must exit
to untrusted code and depend upon the untrusted system
through system call interfaces, including sockets, file I/O
and memory mapped I/O. Unfortunately, this program-
ming model does not provide any secure Input/Output
measurements according to the Intel Software Devel-
oper’s Manual [14]. This unreliable dependency exposes
a large attack surface known as Iago attacks, such as sys-
tem call snooping and I/O traffic analysis.
Due to the intrinsic limitations of SGX, existing SGX-
based projects depend on the untrusted OS services, such
as time service and network service. State-of-the-art in-
enclave library OSes including Haven [5], Graphene-
SGX [57] and Panoply[53] use the untrusted system
clock. However, they cannot detect timestamp forgery
attack. Blockchain systems such as Town Crier [68] de-
pend on an external relay to obtain a trusted time, but
the latency is uncertain due to complex network envi-
ronments. Intel offers a second-accuracy trusted clock
for enclaves, but the time value is course-grained and
not absolute [29]. Instead, Intel SGX SSL [28] uses
the untrusted ftime to achieve millisecond-accuracy time.
Other cryptography libraries like TaLos [30], mbedTLS-
SGX [9] intended for enclave applications also face the
same problem.
Likewise, secure network TSSes are also important.
One approach is that Haven and Graphene-SGX use
a network shielded module to verify results returned
from the untrusted host, which is non-trivial and error-
prone because of the complexity of network protocol
stack [7]. Furthermore, a compromised network stack
is susceptible to traffic injection and communication in-
spection. Another approach targeting network privacy
such as SGX-Tor is also built upon the untrusted network
I/O interfaces, allowing untrusted systems to compro-
mise the anonymity of Tor’ hidden service by endpoint
traffic analysis [54, 43].
This situation urges us to contemplate the following
question: How to provide trusted system services for en-
claves on an untrusted system, in order to build safer
shielded executions? This question is fairly important,
since almost all SGX-based projects exclude the under-
lying system from trusted computing base (TCB) while
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depending on it for system services. This paper does
not cover all system services. We concentrate on accu-
rate absolute time and end-to-end secure network, which
are essentially significant yet rarely discussed in current
SGX-based trusted computing ecosystem.
In this paper, we describe Aurora, a novel framework
that safeguards TSSes for enclaves. Aurora is an archi-
tecture that secures messages from devices to enclaves
and vice versa. Aurora leverages system management
RAM (SMRAM) as a privileged "enclave", to directly in-
teract with devices without involvement of the untrusted
system. The SMRAM is tamper-proof to any other soft-
ware due to the architectural hardware protection. Au-
rora delegates security-critical services to system man-
agement interrupt (SMI) handler located in SMRAM.
The SMI handler can safely access devices while keeping
transparent to the rest of the system.
Both system management mode (SMM) and SGX pro-
vide hardware-based strongly isolated memory region.
In fact, the SGX feature must be enabled by BIOS from
OEM vendors and setup properly by BIOS firmware to
configure the desired size of enclave page cache (EPC).
We hold the insight that BIOS is the key to the availabil-
ity of SGX and can offer a competent SMI handler to
provide TSSes for enclaves in a secure manner.
Aurora supports TSSes for enclaves with the following
properties:
• Extensibility: Aurora is designed to be a general
TSS framework to offer a broad range of devices
with the ease of driver portability. Currently Au-
rora supports five hardware timer and a commodity
network adapter for enclave programs.
• Security: Aurora utilizes SGX EPC memory and
SMRAM to provide strong confidentiality and in-
tegrity. Aurora creates a secure session between
the SMI handler and SGX enclaves. It prevents in-
formation leakage by leveraging identity authenti-
cation, hardware encryption scheme and constant-
time protocol.
• Transparency: Aurora is adversary-unaware and
deployment-friendly. It does not require any modi-
fication on commercial hardware and operating sys-
tems. It supports POSIX APIs for enclave programs
to request TSSes.
• Efficiency: Aurora makes several optimization to
minimize run-time overhead on I/O requests com-
pared with monolithic kernel. It overcomes the ar-
chitectural limitations of Intel SGX by introduc-
ing event-based notification, exit-less interrupts and
batching SMI calls.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• We present Aurora, a new architecture to provide
TSSes for enclaves, with the benefit of extensibility,
security, transparency and efficiency (§ 3.1).
• We design and implement a high-precision and
attack-aware time TSS (§ 3.5) and an end-to-end
network TSS (§ 3.6) based on Aurora. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to support such
TSSes for enclaves.
• We evaluate Aurora using real-world applications:
SQLite and OpenSSL. (§ 5).
2 Background
To provide system services for enclaves, Inktag [21]
and Sego [35] utilized a trusted HV to ensure the in-
tegrity of files for high-assurance processes (HAPs). A
hypervisor (HV) that has higher privilege than the un-
trusted system can regulate the guest and therefore pro-
vide TSSes for applications running on the guest. The
major benefit of this solution is that a trusted HV can
use virtulization to isolate memory region of untrusted
guests and the input–output memory management unit
(IOMMU) to circumvent direct memory access (DMA)
attacks from malicious devices. Although an HV’s code
base (e.g. Xen [4]) is usually smaller than a commodity
kernel, there are many security vulnerabilities over the
years [42], which makes them as attractive attack targets.
Furthermore, these studies did not address the clock and
network TSSes on untrusted systems.
2.1 System Management Mode
System management mode (SMM) is the most privi-
lege mode available in all x86 platforms. The CPU en-
ters SMM upon a system management interrupt (SMI)
and executes the system management handler (SMI Han-
dler), a special segment of code loaded from the BIOS
firmware into system management RAM (SMRAM). An
RSM (resume) instruction is executed at the end of the
SMI hander to switch back to Protected Mode. The OS
or HV is essentially suspended while the SMI handler
executes. This isolated execution provides transparency
to the operating system. The SMI handler can run any
instruction and has complete access to all devices and
control over interrupts regardless of any protections es-
tablished by the OS or HV. We expand the SMI Handler
to design Aurora’s supervior § 3.1.
The critical code and data inside SMRAM is inacces-
sible by other modes. The SMI handler requires only a
small trusted code base and is safe from corruption after
booting when properly configured.
SMM-based protections [71] outperform the kernel-
based and HV-based approaches with its overwhelming
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transparency. To the best our knowledge, researchers
have not use SMM to supply TSSes for TEEs.
2.2 Software Guard Extension
Intel’s SGX provides trusted execution environments
(TEE) called enclaves. Enclave code and data reside in
specialized protected memory called enclave page cache
(EPC). Enclave code can access the memory outside the
enclave. As enclave code is only allowed to be executed
in user mode, any interaction with the device must ex-
ecute outside of the enclave and through untrusted sys-
tem calls. SGX enables a threat model where one only
trusts the Intel CPUs and the code running inside the en-
clave(s).
Previous studies use library OSes [5, 57, 53] to pro-
vides TSSes such as thread scheduling. For I/O services
such as network, the library OSes have to forward such
requests from applications to the untrusted host.
2.3 Threat Model
At the hardware level, we assume that processor is imple-
mented correctly and equipped with flawless SGX func-
tionality. We assume that the SMI handler to be loaded
into SMRAM can be only initialized at boot time by
BIOS firmware from trusted OEM vendor and be made
inaccessible from other operating modes. The SMRAM
is prevented from unauthorized memory accesses (e.g.
cache poisoning [65]). The devices are trusted and can
operate correctly when configured properly. Hardware
attacks on devices are not considered.
At the software level, we consider a powerful adver-
sary that controls the entire system software stack. The
adversary can arbitrarily manipulate the OS, including
scheduling desired threads, simulating signals and soft-
ware exceptions. He may use any I/O commands to trig-
ger hardware interrupts and issue DMA write requests at
will. Denial of service attack (DoS) is out of the scope,
where the untrusted system is able to disable SMI.
Our trusted computing base (TCB) does not consist
of entire BIOS, only the SMI Handler inside SMRAM
is trusted. While we do not claim to prevent all covert
channel attacks, Aurora does mitigate cache attacks on
cryptographic process and timing attacks on requests for
TSSes. We assume that Intel SGX SDK and toolchains
are from the trusted source. We do not consider the en-
clave linked against Aurora’s library to be bug-free [37],
therefore we consider potentially compromised enclaves.
Enclaves that intend to leak secrecy is not considered.
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Figure 1: The architecture of Aurora
3 Aurora Design
In order to provide reliable TSSes, we use the combina-
tion of SGX and SMM because of its hardware enforced
protection. Since the protection is guaranteed at the op-
posite ends of Intel x86’s privilege-level model, we name
our framework after Aurora, which takes place in the po-
lar region. Aurora takes advantage of architectural sup-
port to build TSSes for enclaves. Aurora is composed
of three components: the SMM Supervisor (SSV), in-
enclave TSS library and a secure channel established be-
tween the SSV and enclaves. Figure 1 depicts the overall
architecture of Aurora.
Aurora adopts the philosophy of delegate and emulate
to support TSSes. The process of one TSS request can
be briefly described in the following three steps. First,
Aurora builds a secure channel between SGX enclaves
and SMM Supervisor (SSV). Second, it allows enclaves
to send TSS requests to SSV using a secure session. Last,
SSV executes the desired operations to repsonse the TSS.
This is conceptually similar to a normal system call or
VM hypercall. We name it a SMM call.
3.1 Architecture Overview
(1) The SMM Supervisor (SSV) can take control of in-
terrupts from the untrusted system and it contains
lightweight drivers that handle device interrupts.
The SSV is responsible for determining the source
of interrupts and dispatching interrupts to the un-
trusted system via an IPI or the destined enclave. In
order to provide OS-transparent TSSes, a carefully
designed driver specification is proposed (§ 3.3).
(2) The Aurora TSS library supports standard POSIX
APIs (such as BSD sockets) for enclaves. This
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complements unsupported APIs of Intel SGX SDK,
helping developers to port vanilla applications into
SGX programming model.
(3) The secure channel prevents the TSS secrets leak-
age from the untrusted system. To achieve so, Au-
rora introduces a shared memory and implements a
FIFO module to exchange encrypted messages be-
tween SSV and enclaves. When the user inside the
enclave requests a TSS, it will leave the enclave via
an OCALL and invoke the auxiliary library, which
then "calls" the SSV via an SMI.
Aurora’s Workflow. We take the time TSS as an ex-
ample to illustrate Aurora’s workflow. We break down
the process into the following phrases: 1) The enclave
starts to request the time TSS and this message is en-
crypted inside EPC; 2) The enclave’s FIFO module
copies the encrypted message into the shared memory;
3) The auxiliary library triggers an SMI and switches
the system to SMM; 4) The SSV’s FIFO module copies
the encrypted request to SMRAM; 5) The encrypted re-
quest is successfully decrypted and the SSV invokes the
clock driver; 6) The clock driver reads the real-time value
from the hardware and assembles the data as a response
message inside SMRAM; 7) The response information
is encrypted inside SMRAM and ready to be sent back;
8) The SSV’s FIFO copies the encrypted message into
the shared memory; 9) The SSV clears the secrets and
execute the RSM instruction to return from the SMM;
10) The system is resumed and enclave’s FIFO module
copies the encrypted response into the EPC; 11) The re-
sponse is decrypted inside EPC and the enclave program
successfully obtain the trusted time value.
3.2 SMM Supervisor (SSV)
The SSV is the fundamental component in Aurora.
When SSV receives a TSS request, it takes control of the
target device, including interrupts, to prevent untrusted
systems from interrupt spoofing attacks. Since it may
take charge of more than one device, it needs to de-
termine which device is to be serviced and invoke the
matching driver (§ 3.3).
Interrupts Interception. SSV intercepts device
events by configuring the Redirection Table defined in
I/O Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller [25].
This results in that selected device interrupts are firstly
routed to the SSV. Such techniques are also applied
in [17, 70]. When the SMI is triggered, SSV distin-
guishes the interrupt source and determines which do-
main (the system or an enclave) to be notified. It then
forwards the interrupt using Inter-processor interrupts
(IPIs).
Device Addressing. In order to perform the op-
eration, the driver invoked by SSV needs to know
the exact I/O ports of the target device. At system
boot, the BIOS firmware collects device information
and performs configuration transactions for peripherals
it detects. Meanwhile, the SSV records their memory
mapped I/O (MMIO) base addresses, thereafter the cor-
responding driver can manipulate the mapped configura-
tion space.
Boundary Checking. During run-time, the driver
may require more memory to finish its purpose. SSV
supports a sanity-checking dynamic heap to avoid se-
cret leakage. SSV checks the memory boundary that the
driver accesses to ensure the driver dose not leak infor-
mation outside of SMRAM.
3.3 SMM Driver
Because the kernel drivers are coupled with the untrusted
system and lack effective isolation from the rest of the
privilege software, we cannot reuse them. We port com-
modity drivers with minimal necessary functionalities
and protect them inside SMRAM. We see such effort
feasible for three reasons. First, SMM mode is similar
to kernel mode where privileged CPU instructions are
available. Second, the mechanism of interrupt rerout-
ing helps SMM driver design to concentrate on the in-
terrupt handling rather than device initialization or re-
source management. Third, previous works have shown
how to extract drivers from commodity OSes, including
user space driver implementation [10, 55] and driver iso-
lation [19, 50]. In order to cooperate with Auroa’s SSV,
Aurora requires the drivers to obey a specification as fol-
lows.
Driver Specification. There are three APIs that a
driver needs to provide in order to accomplish the TSS
for enclaves: aurora_probe() makes sure the device is
available and ready to be used, aurora_write() and au-
rora_read() are used to process data flow from and to the
enclaves. The read and write operation logic can be sim-
ply extracted from the interrupt routines in commodity
drivers. We do not allow the driver to re-initialize the
device or expose richer interfaces to enclaves, because
these IOCTLs may be abused by a malicious enclave to
interfere the operations of the normal system.
Guideline. In order to achieve transparency to un-
trusted systems and avoid unexpected misuse of critical
resources, we enforce such confinements on the SMM
driver design:
Pre-condition: Suspend OS. Save context. Enter SMM.
<1> If only a read to the device is required, jump to <3>.
<2> Save the device context, including control registers.
4
<3> Perform operations (read or write). Trigger inter-
rupts immediately to finish the commands.
<4> if device context is saved, restore it.
Post-condition: Exit SMM. Restore context. Resume
OS.
3.4 Secure Session
During a TSS request, we treat the SSV as the server
and the enclave as the client. To provide reliable TSSes
for enclaves, we design a secure session that protects the
messages between the SSV and enclaves. In this section,
we describe the the lifecycle of a secure session.
3.4.1 Establishment
The initial stage of the secure session is to make sure
whether both parties involved in the session are trusted
or not. Since the untrusted system is located between the
two parties, it can launch the man-in-the kernel attack.
We introduce identity authentication to avoid this. When
both parties are acknowledged, they exchange the sym-
metric secret key using key agreement.
Enclave Identity Authentication. An enclave can is-
sue an SMM call using port writing to request SSV’s ser-
vice. The privileged software also has this capability and
may launch SMI-specific fuzzing attacks on the SSV. To
prevent abuse of this mechanism, Aurora uses SGX cre-
dentials during remote attestation to verify the enclave’s
identity. As a result, only the legitimate enclaves have
the right to establish a secure channel with the SSV. In
this sense, requests from untrusted privileged programs
and unauthorized enclaves will be discarded.
Supervisor Identity Authentication. The privileged
system can also fake the identity as an SSV since it can
emulate an SMI and try to handshake with the intended
enclave. We design an approach similar to enclave’s re-
mote attestation to verify SSV’s genuine identity. During
startup, the BIOS communicates with Intel remote server
to establish a secure channel using public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI). The BIOS computes a token on the image
(SSV) to be loaded into SMRAM and sends its hash sig-
nature to verify its integrity and prove its identity.
The remote attestation is significantly vital to Aurora’s
key agreement phrase because it makes sure that:
1. Aurora is running on real SGX-enabled hardware;
2. the SSV is neither counterfeit nor outdated;
3. the integrity of SSV’s initial state is not compromised.
Key Agreement. When an enclave is securely
launched and proves its identity through remote attesta-
tion, the remote server plays the role of certificate author-
ity. The enclave generates a string of random bytes as
the symmetric secret key. The remote server exchanges
this key between the SSV and the enclave instance on
the same machine. At this point, a unique session has
been successfully established. We then use AES-GCM
encryption scheme for further message exchange. The
enclave can reset the channel at any time to mitigate pos-
sible covert-channel attacks.
3.4.2 Communication
Aurora’s objective is to provide TSSes with the proper-
ties of security and efficiency. To achieve security, Au-
rora prevents the untrusted system from inferring secrets
by introducing data obfuscation and hardware encryp-
tion. For efficiency, Aurora adopts FIFO mechanism to
eliminate the expensive transitions.
Data obfuscation. If an enclave requests the same
TSS twice and the results happen to be the same, the en-
crypted messages will also be identical if the session key
is not changed. A malicious attacker can infer secrets
by observing such covert channels. To prevent such se-
crecy leakage, Aurora pads/reassembles all messages to
the same length. Currently we set the fixed size to 4KB,
same as an EPC page size. The message buffers must
start with page-aligned address. This restricts possi-
ble information leakage at coarse-grain page-level. This
property is also referred to as data oblivious [47].
Hardware encryption. The implementation of en-
cryption is an attractive target for attackers [8]. In fact,
Intel has extended x86 ISA with Advanced Encryption
Standard New Instructions (AES-NI) Set and claims to
prevent known side-channel attacks. We make use of it
to address this concern and use constant-time implemen-
tation to defeat cache timing attacks.
Shared Memory. The SGX memory model is asym-
metric: the enclave code can access the entire process
address space. As a result, Aurora library can safely
compute on the shared memory without exiting enclave
mode. On Linux we use a kernel module that allocates
contiguous physical memory (currently 1MB) and ex-
ports an interface as a character device /dev/aurora. The
auxiliary library will open and mmap this device to its ad-
dress space. If the untrusted system launched memory-
based Iago attacks such as mapping a fake device, we
treat it as a DoS attack and the secure session will not be
setup.
Protocol Interface. Aurora provides an uniform ab-
straction API: IOCTL(DEVICE, EPID, OPERATION,
PAYLOAD). The first argument indicates the device that
an enclave desires to communicate with. The second
identifies the authentication of requestor. Intel Enhanced
Privacy ID (EPID) is used for signature verification; we
use it to distinguish enclaves. The third stands for the
operation type to be performed, it can be either of the
three: PROBE, READ and WRITE. The reason is ex-
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plained in § 3.3. The last argument is the message data
to be attached. All the arguments will be marshalled and
encrypted into the shared memory and can be only un-
derstood by the SSV.
FIFO module. For TSSes such as network, the driver
may receive more than one Ethernet frames upon one
interrupt. To maximize throughput, Aurora supports a
buffering mechanism using two dedicated, lock-free FI-
FOs. This is also useful in the case of high frequent
transitions when combined with asynchronous, batched
mechanism. The user can set a desired threshold, so the
auxiliary library will coalesce the interrupts and reduce
the times of costly context switches. For instant requests
such as time TSS, the requestor can directly issue an
SMM call which skips the FIFO buffering. Such opti-
mization mechanism is also applied in [1, 64].
3.4.3 Teardown
When the requestor enclave process exits, the SSV will
terminate the session and release resources. It will dis-
able its service when no enclave is requesting services,
thus making no impact on the system.
3.5 Time TSS
Clocks and timers are simple yet important devices. The
dysfunction of a timer can compromise the normal appli-
cation’s logic, such as connection expiration and certifi-
cate revocation. With a trusted clock source, one is able
to create trusted timestamps. This is especially signifi-
cant in financial transaction (e.g. blockchain) and secure
network (e.g. TLS authentication). Therefore, we extend
our framework to provide absolute, high-precision and
attack-aware time TSS.
Absolute and High Precision. We use Real-Time
Clock (RTC) to provide the absolute wall-clock time for
enclaves. If the RTC clock is not calibrated, it falls back
to offer a reference clock, which is the same functionality
of Intel’s sgx_get_trusted_time(), but provide time with
a much smaller delay, as shown in § 5.5. When higher
precision is required, we use the High Precision Event
Timer (HPET) to compute the tv_usec value in timeval
structure.
Multiple Sources. We also use other hardware
clock sources including Programmable Interval Timer
(PIT) and Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller
(APIC) timer to support Aurora’s Time TSS. We refer-
ence Time Stamp Counter (TSC) to estimate the latency
of other timers and adjust their value. We provide all
timer values to enclaves.
Validation. The hardware timers and clock can be
controlled by the malicious OS. The diversity of timers
offers the ability for enclaves to validate the credibility of
time value. That is, when any of the time values violates
the monotonic rule, we assume a time attack.
In a word, Aurora not only provides the ability to re-
quest time directly from the hardware, but also gains ca-
pability to verify its authenticity.
3.6 Network TSS
We employ SMRAM to protect the integrity of the NIC
driver. However, in order for an enclave to communi-
cate over the network, a protocol stack is also required
and must be protected as well, making an end-to-end net-
work TSS feasible. Previous studies [31, 23, 60, 39, 49]
has proved that adopting kernel-bypass network has ad-
vantages in both scalability and performance, but this ap-
proach suffers from lack of protection for network stack
when running on an untrusted system. We retrofit their
design by protecting the network protocol stack using
SGX isolation. We connect the data link layer in SMM
with the network layer inside enclaves using Aurora’s se-
cure session. We reason about several design choices on
Aurora’s network TSS.
Per-Thread Stack: SGX allows multiple threads to
reenter the enclave mode, thus an in-enclave stack can
serve many threads simultaneously. This requires syn-
chronization mechanism in the application layer. We do
not choose this design because mutual exclusions and
conditional variables from Intel SGX SDK are built upon
untrusted system service. The untrusted OS is responsi-
ble for scheduling all threads and can deliberately con-
struct race conditions, leading to preemption-based at-
tack [62] such as Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use attack.
Instead, we make every thread have its own copy of
stack to avoid critical section. It also guarantees that a
malicious or misbehaving enclave thread can only hurt
itself without corrupting concurrent threads. Likewise,
Aurora uses only one thread in stack layer to process
packets. This means all networking activities are syn-
chronized. The alternative design that one master stack
thread and multiple slave application threads is not con-
sidered because currently EPCs cannot be shared be-
tween enclaves and using system Inter-Process Commu-
nication (IPC) is unsafe and introduces more overhead.
To summarize, our design ensures correct behavior and
simplifies developing effort.
Multistack Coexistence: It is possible for users to
spawn multiple enclave instances to request network ser-
vice at the same time. We use MultiStack [22] approach
to address this issue. Each enclave stack has its own ring
buffer, which accommodates encrypted Ethernet frames
through the secure channel from SSV.
Flow Multiplex. The SSV is responsible to multiplex
corresponding incoming traffics flow for enclaves. There
are several approaches that the SSV can use: i) Multi–
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MAC Addresses. The network stack can share the same
IP address with the host, but the port numbers may con-
flict. In order to assign an IP address to each individual
stack, SSV turns the NIC device into promiscuous mode
and generates unique MAC address to obtain a public
IP through DHCP protocol. However, this brings more
workloads to NIC hardware. ii) Network Address Trans-
lation (NAT). NAT allows to hide enclave networks from
outside and is fit to implement virtual private network
(VPN). In this case, the SMM network driver acts as a
middlebox. iii) Packet Introspection. Both IPv4 and IPv6
reserve an IP_OPTIONS field, we can use this as a dis-
tinct flag to distinguish the flows. We choose the third
because it is flexible and easy to deploy.
4 Implementation
4.1 SMM Supervisor
We modified the SMI handler of SeaBIOS 1.10.0 and im-
plemented our SSV.
Hardware Encryption. In order for AES-NI instruc-
tions to be executed within SMM, we enable the SSE
bit in XCR0 register when switching to the SMM mode.
With the assistance of SSE and AES-NI, we boost en-
cryption performance and effectively reduce the response
time of SSV. On our hardware, the AES-NI based 256-
GCM encryption and decryption on 4KB data in SMM
mode costs 9us on average while the non-AES-NI 128-
GCM implementation of Intel IPP Crypto library [27]
from Linux SGX SDK costs 597us.
Secure Memory Manager. We implemented a secure
heap manager for the purpose of dynamic memory al-
location. The manager makes sure that the memory as-
signed to the driver must be located within SMRAM. The
drivers is responsible to free all allocated memory upon
completion. To avoid possible memory leaks, each time
before returning to the protected mode, the manager will
free all chunks of blocks.
4.2 Time TSS
We reused timer and clock driver implementations of
SeaBIOS, including RTC, HPET, PIT, TSC and APIC
Timer. To minimize the preemption time of time TSS in
SMM, Our driver is only responsible for obtaining the
raw data from hardware clock and timers and we imple-
ment time processing logic in enclave library. The time
TSS library bookkeeps the time values in order to detect
the time attack.
4.3 Network TSS
Network Device Driver. Currently we used AMD PC-
NET, a PCI-based network adapter to implement net-
work TSS. Based on SMM driver specification § 3.3,
three APIs in our prototype are implemented as follows:
aurora_net_probe() obtains access to the base address
register of NIC and indexes TX and RX descriptor rings.
aurora_net_read() iterates every single RX ring buffer.
Once it finds a packet with a particular pattern in the
IP_OPTIONS field, it moves the packet into FIFO mod-
ule.
aurora_net_write() fills next available descriptor with
the frame from the source enclave. Unfortunately, the
SMM driver does not know which ring is ready, so we
suspend the NIC in order to obtain the ring counter from
device control registers directly. On its completion, we
trigger an immediate send signal to NIC and restore the
original values to corresponding registers.
Userland Network Stack. We ported lwIP 2.0.3 into
the enclave. We chose it because of its modularity, ma-
turity and its small code base. We eliminated any de-
pendence of lwIP stack on operating systems. Our net-
work implementation does not require any OCALL ex-
cept triggering SMIs. The global pool for holding pack-
ets and connection states is configured at compile time.
The network stack requires entropy to generate random
port number and timestamps to check connection expira-
tion. We obtain randomness from trustworthy RDRAND
instruction and time value from our trusted time service.
Optimization. When there are not many TSS re-
quests, polling will waste precious CPU resources. We
adopt an interrupt-based mechanism to notify the en-
claves when its relevant TSS is ready. Our current pro-
totype uses a Userspace I/O (UIO) device to relay the
interrupt from SSV. Note that this is an default optimiza-
tion for the untrusted system. If the system refuses to ac-
cept this module, Aurora will fall back to polling mode,
requiring more CPU cycles.
4.4 Code Base
Our current prototype of Aurora SSV consists of 2122
lines of code in total. Our network driver only consists of
161LoC. It is much smaller than that in the commodity
kernel (which is 2312LoC) because our driver concen-
trates on the interrupt handling (§ 3.3), showing that the
efforts to port an existing commodity driver into Aurora
is quite intuitive and straightforward.
Since both SMRAM and EPCs are scarce memory re-
source, we measure the final size of resulting images.
Our modification on SeaBIOS only add 3.9% on its total
size (120.2KB V.S. 115.7KB). The enclave.so is 696KB
in size and 1MB including minimal runtime stack and
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heap allocation. This implies that we could have roughly
56 instances of Aurora with network support in par-
allel without impacting EPC paging performance (The
system-wide EPC limit is approximately 93MB). Such
is suitable for micro-services with critical safety require-
ments [18].
5 Evaluation
Experimental setup. To date, the SMRAM in commod-
ity PCs is carefully protected from modification due to
security issue. To validate our framework without break-
ing hardware protection, we leverage virtualization tech-
nology to emulate the SMM functionality. The SMM
is emulated by QEMU/KVM and SGX is assured by
real hardware. We use Dell Inspiron-5577 laptop with
Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700HQ CPU @ 2.80GHz run-
ning Ubuntu 16.04 LTS and SGX SDK 1.9.100 and SGX
driver 0.10. We use the QEMU emulator provided from
https://github.com/intel/qemu-sgx. We assign one CPU-
core to the QEMU. We use the same CPU model and
run the same software stack (including the system and
drivers) in the guest VM. The virtualized networking
environment for SGX-enabled VMs is setup with Open
vSwitch 2.5.2.
Methodology. We evaluate Aurora by answering the
following questions:
1. Does Aurora offer security guarantees for TSSes?
(§ 5.1)
2. What overhead does Aurora introduce to the sys-
tem? (§ 5.2)
3. What is the quality of time and network TSS?
(§ 5.3)
4. What is the performance overhead of running real-
world applications on Aurora? (§ 5.5, § 5.6)
5.1 Security Analysis
We evaluate Aurora’s security by answering the follow-
ing questions:
Can Aurora protect integrity and confidentiality of
TSS session messages? During a TSS, both parties in
a secure session are located in hardware enforced iso-
lated memory, i.e., SGX EPCs and SMRAM. Any un-
trusted privilege code can never access nor modify them.
The communication channel is protected using an au-
thenticated encryption algorithm (AES-GCM) based on
Intel AES-NI instructions. The secret key and plaintext
messages are carefully protected inside SMRAM and en-
claves.
Can Aurora protect itself from DMA Attacks? SM-
RAM is strongly isolated and can only be accessed when
CPU is in SMM. A hypothetical DMA attack would not
Interval Time cost Overhead ratio
78us 152us 78us 152us
linux native 8.545 8.635 0 0
1000ms 9.045 9.025 5.85% 4.52%
100ms 9.605 9.59 12.40% 11.06%
10ms 10.18 10.455 19.13% 21.08%
1ms 10.16 10.795 18.90% 25.01%
Table 1: Measuring Aurora’s overhead by calculating Pi.
be able to corrupt our SMM driver logic protected in SM-
RAM. Meanwhile, the CPU rejects any DMA transfer
within the Processor Reserved Memory (PRM) region.
However, the unprotected shared memory is suscepti-
ble to DMA attacks. Intel Trusted Execution Technol-
ogy (TXT) can be used to mitigate this. Instead, we as-
sure data cached in unprotected memory to be always en-
crypted. Note that the architectural support cannot pro-
vide seamless switch between enclave and SMM mode,
there exist a time window to allow for data corruption.
Can Aurora protects its secrecy from covert chan-
nel attacks? Even though attackers can exploit the ker-
nel or hypervisor to control over context switches [59],
page faults [66], page walks [11], memory accesses [20]
and LAPIC timers [58] to build high-resolution covert
channels, we see that our TSS events introduces random
level of noise and raises the bar for covert channel at-
tacks. Recall that Aurora allows for resets on the secure
channel, enclave author may wish to reset when a mono-
tonic counter meets a fixed upper-bound. We leave this
heuristic countermeasure for users to decide.
Can Aurora protects network stack from existing
attack? Aurora protects against general traffic analysis
attack on the host side. We do not consider traffic attack
from outside. Future work might put a firewall. Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) or Intrusion Prevention System
(IPS) into SMM layer to enhance its security. We as-
sume cloud service provider to take common LAN secu-
rity measures to protect each host, and is able to mitigate
SYN flooding attacks from outside.
5.2 Aurora’s Overhead
We use pi_css5 program to benchmark the whole system
to measure the overhead introduced by Aurora. We eval-
uate the system slowdown by calculating the Pi number
to 4,000,000 digits of precision. Since the SMM pre-
emption time depends on the TSS response time, and the
occurrence of one TSS request is unpredictable, we use
two durations (78us and 152us) to emulate the real-world
environments, respectively.
We use two threads to conduct this experiment. One
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Action step Time cost(us)
EPC encryption 2
Copy to shared RAM 2
Switch to SMM 13
Copy to SMRAM 0
SMRAM decryption 3
Clock Service 44
SMRAM encryption 3
Copy to shared RAM 0
Return and enter SGX 12
Copy to EPC 3
EPC decryption 2
Table 2: Breakdown of the time TSS
thread (T1) is the program running Pi number calcula-
tion, the other thread (T2) is an enclave program that re-
quests Aurora’s TSS constantly. First we calculate the Pi
number without the interference oh T2 and obtained the
baseline. Then we start T2 to see the slowdown of T1.
We can see that when the interval decreases, the overhead
also decreases. The worst case of Aurora’s overhead is
around 25%, where the TSS is requested too frequently.
Such situation is rare in real world because the enclave
has its own logic to process when obtaining the results
from TSS. When requesting TSS at a normal frequency
like 1s (the second row in the table), the overhead is no
more than 6%. We think that Aurora’s TSS is feasible in
practice.
We can see from the table 1 that the overhead increases
when the interval decreases and the duration increases.
We observe that the intensive TSS requests may impact
the short-life jobs. Notice that we run the benchmark
on only one core of CPU. On a multiple CPU platform,
we can use a dedicated CPU to provide TSS for enclave,
minimizing the impact on time-sensitive tasks.
5.3 Breakdown of Time TSS
It is important to quantify how much time is required to
attain a time TSS since the potential service latency im-
pacts the freshness of message and indicates the response
speed. For this experiment, we instrumented Aurora’s
code and measured the complete time TSS for 10000
time to obtain the average value.
Table ?? shows the observed time taken for each steps,
as explained in item 3.1. We can see that the clock ser-
vice takes most of time. This is because the RTC driver
has to read clock value twice in order to check if the clock
is updating to avoid time data incorrection. The RTC in-
volves several INS instructions to read each field of a
calendar time, therefore it costs as much as 14 us to ob-
tain a complete wall-clock time in one request. The other
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Figure 2: Performance comparison of network stack un-
der different circumstances.
4 timer costs roughly 10 us in sum. The total response
time is nearly 84 us, which satisfies the requirement of
real-world trusted timestamps.
5.4 Latency of Network TSS
To evaluate the influence of Aurora’s architectural over-
head on secure network latency, we measure the enclave
stack latency compared with Ubuntu 16.04 as the base-
line. We study the round trip time of ICMP packets using
nping. We use the command nping -icmp -c 100 -icmp-
type 8 –ip-options \x00 \x00 \x00 \x00 to generate pack-
ets with special IP_OPTIONS pattern. Figure 2 shows
the performance of network stack under different circum-
stances. We observe that majority of the latency is intro-
duced by the SMM context switch, with no more than
7% latency in total compared with the in-kernel stack.
5.5 SQLite with Time TSS
A database keeps track of the activity by recoding the oc-
currence time for its each transaction. Without a trusted
clock source, it may cost more price to maintain the event
causality. SQLite is a popular database choice for lo-
cal storage in application software. It is used today by
several widespread browsers, operating systems, and em-
bedded systems.
We integrated our trusted time TSS into existing SGX-
SQLite [67] and supports standard time APIs includ-
ing time, localtime, utimes and gettimeofday for SGX-
SQLite. We then eliminate its time-related OCALLS
on the untrusted system. We evaluate the trusted
time request performance by executing SQL state-
ments "SELECT date(’now’);" and "SELECT strf-
time(’%s’,’now’);" for 10000 times. For compari-
son, we also benchmark the method of using original
OCALLS and native sgx_get_trusted_time(). Table 3
shows the overall comparison results of existing time ser-
vice approaches.
Any of the approaches for time TSS can be arbitrarily
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Source Approach Type Accuracy Request Cost Latency Security Related Work
Remote Server NTP/PTP absolute 1s >100ms high trusted Slick, Town Crier
CSME PSW relative 1s 10.3ms medium trusted SGX-Tor
OS OCALL absolute 1us 6us low wild Haven, Panoply
Hardware Timer SMM absolute 1us 84us low trusted Aurora
Table 3: Comparison of existing time services that can be used for enclaves. The NTP denotes Network Time Protocol,
the PTP denotes Precision Time Protocol, CSME denotes Intel Converged Security and Management Engine, PSW
denotes the Platform Software.
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Figure 3: Performance comparison of OpenSSL’s TLS
on Linux and Aurora.
delayed in that the untrusted system is in charge of the
enclave thread scheduling. We treat intentionally time
delay as a form of denial of service attack. Our approach
outperforms remote clock and Intel’s reference clock by
introducing very low latency, while achieving the same
accuracy as OS time service.
5.6 OpenSSL with Network TSS
Previous attacks [54, 43, 44] have shown that the attack-
ers can compromise the hidden services of the Tor project
by traffic analysis at the both ends of the client and server
side. Preventing the network path including the protocol
stacks from being traced can mitigate this attack. We
integrated the OpenSSL library from the SGX-Tor [33]
project with our network TSS, protecting its traffic flow
from observing by the untrusted systems or the privi-
leged software.
We use memory pool instead of heap for lwIP to ac-
celerate the TCP memory allocation speed. At both ends,
we disable Nagle’s Algorithm to maximize the through-
put. Since we do not modify the SGX-OpenSSL and it
uses malloc from SGX SDK libc to process TLS mes-
sages, we set 60MB heap to avoid possible EPC paging.
We measure the overhead of to the real-world appli-
cation OpenSSL. We use the Round-Trip-Time (RTT) of
fixed size packets over 100 times and compute the aver-
age time for each packet’s RTT. First, we use the native
SGX-OpenSSL to establish a TLS secure session to mea-
sure the RTT time. In the implementation of native SGX-
OpenSSL, it uses the OCALL to rely on untrusted socket
to send the payloads. Since we focus on providing TSSes
for enclaves in the cloud environment, we then replace
the TLS server with Aurora-OpenSSL server, which re-
quest Aurora’s network TSS to protect its traffic from
end-point observing. Figure 3 shows the experimental
results. In our current network TSS prototype, the total
time of transmit a frame is around 500us, which consists
of 400us to save and restore the context (critical device
control registers) and 100us to complete the transmission
action itself. The reception time is approximately 200us
because the driver needs traverse the RX ring buffer and
check each Ethernet frame. Both of the RTT time consist
of the transmission time, network driver processing time,
network stack processing time and OpenSSL processing
time. We ignore the propagation delay since we setup
our experiment on top of the same machine and use the
virtual network environments. We use the WireShark to
observe the traffic flow. We observe that when the packet
size exceeds 500 Bytes, the Aurora-OpenSSL introduces
around 1000us. This is because the TLS introduces more
packet fragmentation.
6 Discussion
Multi-processor consideration. The current imple-
mentation of our prototype does not consider the multi-
processor scenario. On a multi-processor platform, an
SMI traps the corresponding processor into SMM mode
while other processors remain in protected mode. This
requires mutual exclusiveness mechanism (e.g. IPI) to
synchronize I/O hardware access. Attackers may steal
secrets using other processors as a covert channel.
Verified SMM supervisor. Because SMM has the
highest privilege, bugs and crashes in SMRAM are dis-
astrous to the whole system. We have statically analyze
our prototype using Clang Static Analyzer [26] and fix all
vulnerabilities we found, but we cannot prove that it has
no bugs that can be exploited by the adversary. We plan
to formally verify our SSV in the future to make sure it
will not compromise the rest of the system and regulate
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the SMM drivers as expected.
Future work. OpenVPN is a suitable case that will
benefit from our network TSS. On the untrusted cloud,
the VPN server discloses the intent of the VPN client
and thereby exposes the user privacy. We plan to support
network TSS for OpenVPN in the future.
7 Related Work
Trusted I/O Path. Zhou et al. [72] uses a micro-
hypervisor to build a verifiable trusted path between I/O
devices and applications, assuring secrecy and authen-
ticity on x86 systems. It leverages IOMMU to miti-
gate DMA attacks and the hypervisor to prevent from
interrupt spoofing attacks. Our approach also defends
against DMA attacks and takes over device interrupts.
SGXIO [63] offers generic trusted I/O paths for en-
claves by combining TPM, SGX and hypervisor. Unlike
SGXIO, we use the most privileged mode to build trusted
paths instead of a trusted hypervisor. AuditedIO [3]
leverages SGX and a kernel module to implement ver-
ifiable data storage for trustworthy disk I/O. However,
its kernel module is not protected and may be compro-
mised. We protect our supervisor in SMRAM and use
remote attestation to ensure its authenticity. Bumpy [40]
utilizes dedicated hardware to establish trusted user input
path and hence cannot generalize to other devices. Trus-
tUI [38] splits mobile drivers into front-end and back-end
facilitated by ARM TrustZone and builds a trusted path
between user and Internet service. ARM TrustZone can
not only isolate physical memory but also peripheral in-
terrupts. Our solution achieves the interrupt isolation by
routing desired interrupts to SMI.
SMM-based Protection. Our approach was inspired
by Scotch [36], which is the first work that combines
SGX and SMM to monitor and audit cloud resource us-
age. Its motivation differs from ours. TrustLogin [70]
leverages SMM for users to login a remote server without
leaking sensitive credentials, even when the OS is com-
promised. IOCheck [71] leverages an SMM monitor to
check the integrity of I/O configurations and firmware at
runtime, rather than providing SMM-based I/O services.
Prior works like HyperCheck [61] and HyperSentry [2],
Spectre [69] aim to protect kernel integrity with assis-
tance of SMM.
Trusted Time Service. The SGX v1 [41] disallows
RDTSC and RDTSCP executed inside enclaves. As a
compensation, Intel releases an alternative that supports
trusted time and monotonic counters using Intel Man-
agement Engine. However, this service is coarse-grained
and does not provide a wall-clock time. Our solution pro-
vides rather high accuracy trusted time value. Slick [56]
achieves high-precision yet low-latency clock service by
on-NIC PTP clock. However, the time source is not
secure because enclaves cannot detect the tampering of
NIC-Timer. By contrast, our approach can detect time
attack using cross validation. Déjà Vu [13] implements a
reference clock thread using TSX to provide a trustwor-
thy source of time measurement. Déjà Vu’s goal is to
detect interrupt-based attacks, while we provide a gen-
eral time service for enclaves.
Secure Network Service. IX [6] offers robust protec-
tion to its network stack via privilege separation leverag-
ing Intel VT-x technology. Arrakis [48] uses IOMMU to
protect network device access. SCONE [1] uses a TLS-
based network shield to protect application’s payloads
inside containers. SGX-Tor [33] provides secure net-
working for Tor using in-enclave SSL/TLS. However, it
depends on 57 system calls and thereby introduces large
attack vectors. LightBox [16], Trusted Click [15] and
Slick [56] focus on securing middleboxes. By contrast,
Aurora’s goal is to provide end-to-end security, it pro-
tects network from L1 to L7.
8 Conclusions
We present Aurora, a novel architecture which can pro-
vide trusted system services for enclaves on an untrusted
underlying system. Based on Aurora, we implement a
time service with high-precision and attack-awareness
and an end-to-end network service. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to provide such TSSes for
enclaves. Our prototype implementation demonstrates
that Aurora is extensible and transparent with underly-
ing commodity systems. Performance evaluation with
real-world applications and security analysis show that
Aurora is practical to provide trusted system service for
SQLite and OpenSSL.
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